Mitigation, BGP, and Recovery
Configure verified response connectors, protect critical addresses, approve narrow mitigation, and verify recovery.
On this page
Detection works without a response connector. Configure mitigation only when the organisation has an authorised network design, an approval policy, an independent verification method, and a tested rollback owner.
RTBH discards all traffic to the announced target, blocklists can over-match, and scrubbing requires a contracted provider with compatible routing. An accepted API request is never proof that mitigation took effect.
Choose an approval mode
| Mode | Behaviour |
|---|---|
| Manual queue | An authorised responder explicitly queues every supported action. |
| Single approval | A proposal waits for one authorised responder. |
| Dual control | Two distinct authorised responders must approve. |
| Verified automatic | Eligible critical detections can queue a verified automatic connector, while all scope, exclusion, entitlement, and permission safeguards still apply. |
Configure and verify a connector
Open Response & BGP. Supported connector designs include RouterOS RTBH, RouterOS local exact-host blackhole, a contracted scrubbing provider, blocklist, external BGP neighbour, and webhook. New connectors remain Pending until their external route, session, endpoint, or device state is verified.
Configure the ISPbills RouterOS peer
- Select a connected RouterOS 7 device and choose Configure ISPbills BGP peer.
- Review the router record, management endpoint, local and remote ASNs, BGP endpoint, and multihop design.
- Allow the real peer endpoint on TCP/179 through cloud security groups, host firewalls, and NAT.
- Wait until both RouterOS and the ISPbills speaker report Established.
- Confirm that the active announcement count is zero before the first incident response.
The one-click setup creates a dedicated router instance, inbound exact-host blackhole policy, outbound deny policy, and eBGP multihop session. Setup does not announce an incident target. An approved incident can announce only the detected IPv4 /32 with blackhole community 65535:666; wider prefixes are rejected and the route is withdrawn at expiry.
Protect critical addresses
Add peering, point-to-point, authoritative DNS, management, monitoring, collector, BGP, and other essential addresses to the Mitigation allowlist. Detection can continue, but manual and automatic action against an excluded address is rejected.
The automatic safety perimeter also checks tenant router, OLT, switch, and radio management addresses, gateways, connector endpoints, and the full suspended-user pool. It is re-evaluated during proposal, approval, sensor claim, and final execution.
Propose the narrowest response
- Confirm the exact target and that it remains inside protected scope.
- Verify the connector is Ready and review its actual external state.
- Choose the narrowest supported target and shortest practical duration.
- Record expected customer impact and the rollback method.
- Submit the request through the configured approval workflow.
- Watch the incident timeline for claim, execution, expiry, cancellation, or failure.
Verify and recover
- Confirm route, provider, blocklist, or device state independently from ISPbills.
- Check BPS, PPS, FPS, packet loss, latency, and the affected service.
- Watch for traffic shifting to another protected target or address family.
- Withdraw or roll back through the same connector that applied the change.
- Confirm the route or rule is gone and the service remains stable.
- Mark the incident Resolved, preserve evidence, and record policy or runbook improvements.
Response troubleshooting
- Pending connector: verify the actual external endpoint, peer, route, or device state.
- BGP not established: check endpoint reachability, TCP/179, ASNs, multihop, NAT, firewall, and both peer states.
- Proposal rejected: check protected scope, mitigation exclusions, entitlement, permissions, connector readiness, and lifecycle state.
- No observed improvement: confirm execution independently, re-check the target and vector, and escalate to the upstream or scrubber without broadening scope blindly.
- Withdrawal incomplete: use the connector’s rollback path, inspect active route/rule state, and keep the incident open until removal is confirmed.
During an event, use the printable DDoS Protection → Runbook alongside the attack investigation guide.